The Dungaree Uniform

When Sailors Looked Like Sailors

Why did Sailors wear blue denim aka dungaree uniform?

ANSWER: The blue denim uniform, dungarees, was the Sailor’s working uniform.

In 1901 regulations authorized the first use of denim jumpers and trousers, and the 1913 regulations permitted the dungaree uniform to be used by both officers and enlisted with the prescribed hat of the day.

Officer’s engaged in aviation introduced the khaki uniform and eventually it was the accepted working uniform for officers.

Chief Petty Officers were, in time, allowed to don the khaki work uniform.

As a junior enlisted….dungarees were my favorite uniform….it was a sad day for me when they replaced the dungaree uniforms.

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San Miguel Lied To Me Again

Garland Davis

You began to call me as I left the brow

Telling me the way to love

Saying I was good looking n rich

The sailor most bar girls were dreaming of

Then after I had drunk for an hour

You began to point out all the girls

And counting out their Barfine

Sure enough, I fell in love

As you cheered “Go, Man, Go!”

But, San Miguel, you lied to me again

(Yes, you did)

You told me she was worth the cost

That I was a lucky, lucky man

You told me she was the one

That I’d still love her tomorrow morn

But, San Miguel, you lied to me again

I once counted on PBR, Coors too

But they always let me down

They’d line me up with the bar hog queen

Next day she looked like the hog sty queen

Miller couldn’t find me a beauty

And old Lucky Lager failed when he said he could

Yeah. Y’all are all smooth talkers. But

Your eyesight ain’t real good

I’m forgetting about you, but not the girls and song

And the next time I go over, you ain’t gonna be along

But, San Miguel, you lied to me again

(Yes, you did)

You told me she was worth the cost

That I was a lucky, lucky man

You told me she was the one

That I’d still love her tomorrow morn

But, San Miguel, you lied to me again

(Yes, you did)

Attack on Estevan Point.

Artwork by Dale Byhre

In the waning light of June 20, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Navy submarine I-26, surfaced off the west coast of Vancouver Island. Chugging along on her diesel engines, the I-26 proceeded to open fire on the Point Estevan light and radio direction finding RDF station. Realizing the facility was under attack, the lighthouse quickly keeper turned off the light. The sub fired up to thirty rounds without scoring a single hit before departing and returning to Yokosuka on July 7, 1942.

The I-26 had been dispatched to seek targets in conjunction with the Japanese Navy’s larger operation at Midway Islands. While operating off the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the I-26 sank two US merchant ships before attacking the light station.

Later in the war, the I-26 would manage to cripple the carrier Saratoga and sink the light cruiser Juneau. She would eventually be sunk herself by US Naval forced off Leyte on November 21, 1944.

While not causing any damage at Estevan Point, the I-26’s attack had far-ranging effects. All west coast lighthouses were ordered to extinguish their lights. Coastal shipping was more greatly endangered by that decision than by any enemy submarines.

Flag Day Speech

Lt. Collins’ Flag Day Speech (from “The Sand Pebbles”)

As I’m sure most of you know, today is Flag Day, a day meant to honor the United States flag and to commemorate the Flag’s adoption.

Unfortunately, it is apparently more popular now to stomp on or burn the Flag, or not to fly it, because it may offend some fringe group or other…

The following speech from a movie is appropriate for today’s Blog post. There are many Americans who respect and honor the flag, who get a tightness in the chest, and watery eyes when they see the Stars and Stripes proudly flying from the yardarm of a Ship of War, or raised on the flagpole in some foreign land.

This post is for those of you who are currently serving, have served, or who just respect and honor the Flag and what it stands for…

“Today we begin cruising to show the flag on Tungting Lake and the Hunan Rivers. I want all honors rendered smartly.

At home in America, when today reaches them it will be Flag Day. For us who

wear the uniform every day is Flag Day.

It is said that there will be no more wars. We must pretend to believe that.

But when war comes, it is we who will take the first shock, and buy time with

our lives. It is we who keep the Faith…

We serve the Flag. The trade we all follow is the give and take of death.

It is for that purpose that the people of America maintain us. And anyone of

us who believes he has a job like any other, for which he draws a money wage, is a thief of the food he eats, and a trespasser in the bunk in which he lies down to sleep.”—Lt. Collins

Army Birthday

14 June 1775

Army Birthdays. The U.S. Army was founded on 14 June 1775, when the Continental Congress authorized the enlistment of expert riflemen to serve the United Colonies for one year.

U.S. Navy First Circumnavigation

In 1826 our newly elected 6th President John Quincy Adams amplified his predecessor, James Monroe’s, desire to project a US presence into the wide Pacific. On 3 September 1826 Quincy Adams’ Secretary of the Navy, Samuel Southard, dispatched the newly commissioned sloop USS VINCENNES, 18, under Master Commandant William B. Finch, and the 44-gun frigate BRANDYWINE from Norfolk around Cape Horn to join a growing number of US warships protecting American whalers in the Pacific. For several years VINCENNES thus cruised the Pacific. In June of 1829, she received orders to call on the Society Islands and the Sandwich Islands (modern Hawaii). Adams wished to cultivate the friendships with King Kamehameha and other South Pacific chiefs that Master Commandant Thomas Catesby ap Jones had fostered during the PEACOCK, 18, the cruise of 1826. VINCENNES next got underway for Macao, China, then on to Manila, where she made landfall on 29 January 1830. She had cruised over three and a half years before she was finally ordered home via the Cape of Good Hope for a much-needed overhaul. On this date, VINCENNES arrived in New York after brief stops at Capetown and the island of St. Helena. During the voyage, Finch discovered two previously unknown islands and corrected existing charts when he sailed across the charted location of a third. The course of her travels during this 4-year cruise earned her the distinction of being the first US Navy vessel to circumnavigate the Globe. Finch did not fail to recognize this latter achievement, stating of circumnavigation, “none is more trying to a ship’s qualities, hull, rigging and spars, and only such vessel as is most perfect in every respect, ought to undertake it.”

Navies have used world cruises as a show of force and capability. For example, we announced our facility for steam-powered cruising with our first mechanically powered circumnavigation between 7 December 1878 and 9 November 1880, when Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt and the screw sloop TICONDEROGA made a well-publicized good-will cruise. The ability to move an entire fleet anywhere in the world was demonstrated by the cruise of Teddy Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet in 1907-09. Years later the Cold War brought more demonstrations of US Naval might. CAPT Edward L. Beach and the nuclear submarine Triton (SSN-586) followed the route taken by the explorer Ferdinand Magellan in the 1520s and on 10 May 1960 completed an 84-day world cruise–submerged. Then in October of 1964, our Navy’s nuclear prowess was further highlighted when BAINBRIDGE (DLGN-25), LONG BEACH (CGN-9) and ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) completed Operation Sea Orbit, a two- month, 30,000-mile un-replenished surface circumnavigation.

CAPT James Bloom, Ret.

Department of the Navy, Naval History Division. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol 7 “T-V”. Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, p. 525.

Love, Robert W. History of the US Navy, Vol 1 1775-1941. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992, pp. 143-44.

Mack, William P. and Royal W. Connell. Naval Ceremonies, Customs and Traditions, 5th ed. Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1980, p. 115.

Sweetman, Jack. American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 1775-Present, 2nd ed. Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 1991, pp. 43, 97, 98, 235-36, 240.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The first American Flag to circle the Globe actually predates VINCENNES by 40 years. From 1787-90, a civilian Captain named Robert Gray carried our Flag ’round the world on two ships, beginning on the merchant sloop SS Washington which he sailed to China. There he assumed command of the merchant ship SS Columbia to complete a voyage that covered 41,899 miles.

Beyond Words

Michael McGrorty

We were just out of the yards in Yokosuka, doing a shakedown off the coast of Japan. You know how that is—you’re on a tight schedule and nearly always at GQ, trying to qualify so you can get back to port and prepare for the next cruise. The days are long and you drill until you forget what day it is. We were in one of those modes when dinner came around. They were going to give us an hour to eat and catch a nap before another exercise. I ate in the usual five minutes and then went for a stroll, hoping to find some nice weather out on the fantail of our Knox-Class FF. I went out but there was no sun; the sky was full of gray, drizzly clouds.

And then all of a sudden it happened: the sky opened to the west like a pair of huge curtains parting, and in the gap, gilded by the sun, lay the cone of Mount Fuji, snow-covered for a third of her height, clean as a razor’s edge and utterly beautiful. I turned to see my shipmates, some of them filthy from the fire room, all of us tired as hell, and every single one of them had a look on his face as if it were Christmas morning.

======

I was about a week out on my first Westpac cruise, and we were taking our time about getting across the Pacific, playing games with a carrier task force, drilling, and using up fuel. Then came the day we were to hit land again.

I was up long before sunrise, packing mail into bags, moving boxes, and getting ready for the sort of incoming you get when you’re away for more than a couple of days. I tied the last of many mail sacks to the outside of my tiny post office, and went to the weather decks to watch the sun come up.

On the ocean the sun doesn’t rise; it simply flashes the day to life. There aren’t long shadows because there isn’t any object to cast them. There’s only a line separating the sea from the sky that appears, with a pink glow that flares to bright blue in an instant, before you can sip your coffee.

I was standing next to the cracker-box missile launcher on the stern, all alone, waiting to see land. When day broke, the sea appeared in sparks of gold where the sun struck the wave-tops. And then, out of the ocean like Neptune, rose a huge mound, green as an emerald, encircled by wisps of cloud; something out of a fantasy. It was Hawaii. I stood there staring until a guy walked up and said “First time? Yeah, there aren’t words for that.” And there aren’t, really.

USS Liberty (AGTR-5)

USS Liberty was originally the 7,725 long tons (7,849 t) (light) civilian cargo vessel Simmons Victory, a mass-produced, standard-design Victory Ship, the follow-on series to the famous Liberty Ships that supplied the Allies with cargo during World War II. It was acquired by the United States Navy and converted to an auxiliary technical research ship (AGTR), a cover name for National Security Agency (NSA) “spy ships” carrying out signals intelligence missions. It began its first deployment in 1965, in waters off the west coast of Africa. It carried out several further operations during the next two years.

Attack on the Liberty

Events leading to the attack

During the Six-Day War between Israel and several Arab nations, the United States of America maintained a neutral country status. Several days before the war began, the USS Liberty was ordered to proceed to the eastern Mediterranean area to perform a signals intelligence collection mission in international waters near the north coast of Sinai, Egypt. After the war erupted, due to concerns about its safety as it approached its patrol area, several messages were sent to Liberty to increase its allowable closest point of approach (CPA) to Egypt’s and Israel’s coasts from 12.5 and 6.5 nautical miles (14.4 and 7.5 mi; 23.2 and 12.0 km), respectively, to 20 and 15 nautical miles (23 and 17 mi; 37 and 28 km), and then later to 100 nautical miles (120 mi; 190 km) for both countries. Unfortunately, due to ineffective message handling and routing, these messages were not received until after the attack.

According to Israeli sources, at the start of the war on 5 June, General Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Air Force (IAF) chief of staff informed Commander Ernest Carl Castle, the American naval attaché in Tel Aviv, that Israel would defend its coast with every means at its disposal, including sinking unidentified ships. He asked the U.S. to keep its ships away from Israel’s shore or at least inform Israel of their exact positions.

American sources said that no inquiry about ships in the area was made until after the attack on Liberty. In a message sent from U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to U.S. Ambassador Walworth Barbour in Tel Aviv, Israel, Rusk asked for “urgent confirmation” of Israel’s statement. Barbour responded: “No request for info on U.S. ships operating off Sinai was made until after Liberty incident.” Further, Barbour stated: “Had Israelis made such an inquiry it would have been forwarded immediately to the chief of naval operations and other high naval commands and repeated to Department of State. With the outbreak of war, Captain William L. McGonagle of Liberty immediately asked Vice Admiral William I. Martin at the United States Sixth Fleet headquarters to send a destroyer to accompany Liberty and serve as its armed escort and as an auxiliary communications center. The following day, Admiral Martin replied: “Liberty is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation. Request denied.] He promised, however, that in the unlikely event of an inadvertent attack, jet fighters from the Sixth Fleet would be overhead in ten minutes.

Meanwhile, on 6 June, at the United Nations, in response to United Arab Republic complaints that the United States was supporting Israel in the conflict, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg told the Security Council that vessels of the Sixth Fleet were several hundred miles from the conflict. When the statement was made this was the case, since Liberty, now assigned to the Sixth Fleet, was in the central Mediterranean Sea, passing between Libya and Crete. It would ultimately steam to about 13 nm (15 mi; 24 km) north of the Sinai Peninsula.

On the night of 7 June Washington time, early morning on 8 June, 01:10Z or 3:10 am local time, the Pentagon issued an order to Sixth Fleet headquarters to tell Liberty to come no closer than 100 nautical miles (120 mi; 190 km) to Israel, Syria, or the Sinai coast. According to the Naval Court of Inquiry and the National Security Agency official history, the order to withdraw was not sent on the radio frequency that Liberty monitored for her orders until 15:25 Zulu, several hours after the attack, due to a long series of administrative and message routing problems. The Navy said a large volume of unrelated high-precedence traffic, including intelligence intercepts related to the conflict, were being handled at the time; and that this combined with a shortage of qualified radiomen contributed to the delayed transmission of the withdrawal message.

Visual contact

Official testimony combined with Liberty ’s deck log establishes that throughout the morning of the attack, 8 June, the ship was overflown, at various times and locations, by IAF aircraft. The primary aircraft type was the Nord Noratlas; there were also two unidentified delta-wing jets at about 9:00 am Sinai time (GMT+2). Liberty crewmembers say that one of the Noratlas aircraft flew so close to Liberty that noise from its propellers rattled the ship’s deck plating, and that the pilots and crewmembers waved to each other. It was later reported, based on information from IDF sources, that the over-flights were coincidental, and that the aircraft was hunting for Egyptian submarines that had been spotted near the coast.

At about 5:45 am Sinai time, a ship-sighting report was received at Israeli Central Coastal Command (CCC) in respect of Liberty, identified by an aerial naval observer as “apparently a destroyer, sailing 70 miles [110 km] west of Gaza”.The vessel’s location was marked on a CCC control table, using a red marker, indicating an unidentified vessel. At about 6:00 am, the aerial naval observer, Major Uri Meretz, reported that the ship appeared to be a U.S. Navy supply ship; at about 9:00 am the red marker was replaced with a green marker to indicate a neutral vessel. About the same time, an Israeli jet fighter pilot reported that a ship 20 miles (32 km) north of Arish had fired at his aircraft after he tried to identify the vessel. Israeli naval command dispatched two destroyers to investigate, but they were returned to their previous positions at 9:40 am after doubts emerged during the pilot’s debriefing] After the naval observer’s Noratlas landed and he was debriefed, the ship he saw was further identified as the USS Liberty, based on its “GTR-5” hull markings.[25] USS Liberty’s marker was removed from CCC’s Control Table at 11:00 am, due to its positional information being considered out of date.

At 11:24 am, the Israeli chief of naval operations received a report that Arish was being shelled from the sea. An inquiry into the source of the report was ordered to determine its validity. The report came from an air support officer in Arish. Additionally, at 11:27 am the Israeli Supreme Command head of operations received a report stating that a ship had been shelling Arish, but the shells had fallen short. (The investigative journalist James Bamford points out that Liberty had only four .50 caliber machine guns mounted on her decks and, thus, could not have shelled the coast.) The Head of Operations ordered that the report be verified and that it be determined whether or not Israeli Navy vessels were off the coast of Arish. At 11:45 am, another report arrived at Supreme Command saying two ships were approaching the Arish coast.

Israeli Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) in formation, c. 1967. These were the MTBs that attacked USS Liberty.

The shelling and ship reports were passed from Supreme Command to Fleet Operations control center.[27] The Chief of Naval Operations took them seriously, and at 12:05 pm torpedo boat Division 914 was ordered to patrol in the direction of Arish. Division 914, codenamed “Pagoda”, was under the command of Commander Moshe Oren. It consisted of three torpedo boats numbered: T-203, T-204, and T-206. At 12:15 pm, Division 914 received orders to patrol a position 20 miles (32 km) north of Arish.[27] As Commander Oren headed toward Arish, he was informed by Naval Operations of the reported shelling of Arish and told that IAF aircraft would be dispatched to the area after the target had been detected. Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was concerned that the supposed Egyptian shelling was the prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank Israeli forces. Rabin reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in the area, but advised caution, as Soviet vessels were reportedly operating nearby.

At 1:41 pm, the torpedo boats detected an unknown vessel 20 miles northwest of Arish and 14 miles (23 km) off the coast of Bardawil. The ship’s speed was estimated on their radars. The combat information center officer on T-204, Ensign Aharon Yifrah, reported to the boat’s captain, Commander Moshe Oren, that the target had been detected at a range of 22 miles (35 km), that her speed had been tracked for a few minutes, after which he had determined that the target was moving westward at a speed of 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph). These data were forwarded to the Fleet Operations control center.

The speed of the target was significant because it indicated that the target was a combat vessel. Moreover, Israeli forces had standing orders to fire on any unknown vessels sailing in the area at over 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph), a speed which, at the time, could only be attained by warships. The Chief of Naval Operations asked the torpedo boats to double-check their calculations. Yifrah twice recalculated and confirmed his assessment.A few minutes later, Commander Oren reported that the target, now 17 miles (27 km) from his position, was moving at a speed of 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph) on a different heading Bamford, however, points out that Liberty‘s top speed was far below 28 knots. His sources say that at the time of the attack Liberty was following her signal-intercept mission course along the northern Sinai coast, at about 5 knots (9.3 km/h; 5.8 mph) speed.

The data on the ship’s speed, together with its direction, gave the impression that it was an Egyptian destroyer fleeing toward port after shelling Arish. The torpedo boats gave chase but did not expect to overtake their target before it reached Egypt. Commander Oren requested that the Israeli Air Force dispatch aircraft to intercept. At 1:48 pm, the Chief of Naval Operations requested dispatch of fighter aircraft to the ship’s location.

The IAF dispatched two Mirage III fighter jets that arrived at Liberty at about 2:00 pm. The formation leader, Captain Iftach Spector, attempted to identify the ship. He radioed to one of the torpedo boats his observation that the ship looked like a military ship with one smokestack and one mast. He also communicated, in effect, that the ship appeared to him like a destroyer or another type of small ship. In a post-attack statement, the pilots said they saw no distinguishable markings or flag on the ship.

At this point, a recorded exchange took place between a command headquarters weapons systems officer, one of the air controllers, and the chief air controller questioning a possible American presence. Immediately after the exchange, at 1:57 pm, the chief air controller, Lieutenant-Colonel Shmuel Kislev, cleared the Mirages to attack.

Air and sea attacks

After being cleared to attack, the Mirages dove on the ship and attacked with 30-mm cannons and rockets. The attack came a few minutes after the crew completed a chemical attack drill, with Captain McGonagle on the command bridge. The crew was in “stand-down mode”, with their helmets and life jackets removed. Battle readiness “modified condition three” was set, which meant that the ship’s four .50 caliber machine guns were manned and ammunition was ready for loading and firing. Eight crewmen were either killed immediately or received fatal injuries and died later, and 75 were wounded. Among the wounded was McGonagle, who was hit in the right thigh and arm. During the attack, antennas were severed, gas drums caught fire, and the ship’s flag was knocked down. McGonagle sent an urgent request for help to the Sixth Fleet, “Under attack by unidentified jet aircraft, require immediate assistance”.

The Mirages left after expending their ammunition and were replaced by two Dassault Mysteres armed with napalm bombs, flown by Captain Yossi Zuk and his wingman, Yaakov Hamermesh. The Mysteres released their payloads over the ship and strafed it with their cannons. Much of the ship’s superstructure caught fire.] The Mysteres were readying to attack again when the Israeli Navy, alerted by the absence of return fire, warned Kislev that the target could be Israeli. Kislev told the pilots not to attack if there was any doubt about identification, and the Israeli Navy quickly contacted all of its vessels in the area. The Israeli Navy found that none of its vessels were under fire, and the aircraft were cleared to attack. However, Kislev was still disturbed by a lack of return fire and requested one last attempt to identify the ship. Captain Zuk made an attempt at identification while strafing the ship. He reported seeing no flag but saw the ship’s GTR-5 marking. Kislev immediately ordered the attack stopped. Kislev guessed that the ship was American.

The fact that the ship had Latin alphabet markings led Chief of Staff Rabin to fear that the ship was Soviet. Though Egyptian warships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. Rabin ordered the torpedo boats to remain at a safe distance from the ship and sent in two Hornet (Aérospatiale Super Frelon) helicopters to search for survivors. These radio communications were recorded by Israel. The order was also recorded in the torpedo boat’s log, although Commander Oren claimed not to have received it. The order to cease fire was given at 2:20 pm, twenty-four minutes before the torpedo boats arrived at the Liberty‘s position.

During the interval, crewmen aboard Liberty hoisted a large American flag. During the early part of the air attack and before the torpedo boats were sighted, Liberty sent a distress message that was received by Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier USS Saratoga. Aircraft carrier USS America dispatched eight aircraft. The carrier had been in the middle of strategic exercises. Vice-Admiral William I. Martin recalled the aircraft minutes later.

McGonagle testified at the naval court of inquiry that during

the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high-speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 [degrees] at a distance of about 15 [nautical] miles. The ship at the time was still on [westward] course 283 [degrees] true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots.[19]:38

McGonagle testified that he “believed that the time of the initial sighting of the torpedo boats … was about 14:20”, and that the “boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots [50 to 56 km/h]”, and that it “appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude”.

When the torpedo boats arrived, Commander Oren could see that the ship could not be the destroyer that had supposedly shelled Arish or any ship capable of 30 knots (56 km/h) speed. According to Michael Limor, an Israeli naval reservist serving on one of the torpedo boats, they attempted to contact the ship by heliograph and radio but received no response. At 6,000 meters (20,000 ft), T-204 paused and signalled “AA”, which means “identify yourself”. Due to damaged equipment, McGonagle could only reply using a handheld Aldis lamp. Oren recalled receiving a similar response from the Ibrahim el Awal, an Egyptian destroyer captured by Israel during the Suez Crisis, and was convinced that he was facing an enemy ship. He consulted an Israeli identification guide to Arab fleets and concluded the ship was the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir, based on observing its deck line, midship bridge and smokestack. The captain of boat T-203 reached the same conclusion independently. The boats moved into battle formation but did not attack.

Liberty turns to evade Israeli torpedo boats

As the torpedo boats rapidly approached, Captain McGonagle ordered a sailor to proceed to machine gun Mount 51 and open fire.[19]:38 However, he then noticed that the boats appeared to be flying an Israeli flag, and “realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error”.[19]:39 Captain McGonagle ordered the man at gun mount 51 to hold fire, but a short burst was fired at the torpedo boats before the man understood the order.[19]:39

McGonagle observed that machine gun Mount 53 began firing at the center torpedo boat at about the same time gun mount 51 fired and that its fire was “extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat”. Machine gun mount 53 was located on the starboard amidships side, behind the pilot house. McGonagle could not see or “get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge”. So, he “sent Mr. Lucas around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell [Seaman] Quintero, whom [he] believed to be the gunner on Machine gun 53, to hold fire”. Ensign Lucas “reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53.” Lucas, who had left the command bridge during the air attack and returned to assist Captain McGonagle, believed that the sound of gunfire was likely from ammunition cooking off, due to a nearby fire. Previously, Lucas had granted a request from Quintero to fire at the torpedo boats, before heat from a nearby fire chased him from gun mount 53. McGonagle later testified, at the Court of Inquiry, that this was likely the “extremely effective” firing event he had observed.

After coming under fire, the torpedo boats returned fire with their cannons, killing Liberty’s helmsman. The torpedo boats then launched five torpedoes at the Liberty. At 1235Z (2:35 local time) a torpedo hit Liberty on the starboard side forward of the superstructure, creating a 40 ft (12 m) wide hole in what had been a cargo hold converted to the ship’s research spaces and killing 25 servicemen, almost all of them from the intelligence section, and wounding dozens. It has been said the torpedo hit a major hull frame that absorbed much of the energy; crew members reported that if the torpedo had missed the frame the Liberty would have split in two. The other four torpedoes missed the ship.

The torpedo boats then closed in and strafed the ship’s hull with their cannons and machine guns. According to some crewmen, the torpedo boats fired at damage control parties and sailors preparing life rafts for launch. (See disputed details below.) A life raft which floated from the ship was picked up by T-203 and found to bear US Navy markings. T-204 then circled Liberty, and Oren spotted the designation GTR-5 but saw no flag. It took until 3:30 pm to establish the ship’s identity. Shortly before the Liberty‘s identity was confirmed, the Saratoga launched eight aircraft armed with conventional weapons towards Liberty. After the ship’s identity was confirmed, the General Staff was notified and an apology was sent to naval attaché Castle. The aircraft approaching Liberty were recalled to the Saratoga.